The idea of a 'single' or national force was mooted from the 1850s onwards in moments of unrest, disorder and emergency, but for most of the twentieth-century it remained anathema.
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for and against geographical consolidation, and examining who was articulating them within a public sphere. Secondly, given the current preoccupation with 'local policing' and the desire to retain it as an emphasis within a single service, it examines how the idea of 'local policing' was articulated in the historical past, and what was understood by it, both for those who supported as well as those who opposed greater amalgamation. Finally, it addresses comparative questions. As Clive Emsley's work has shown, 'the steady march of centralisation' is equally apparent across the history of policing and governance in England and Wales in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 6 Yet in the twenty-first century its organisation has gone in almost diametrically opposed ways, with the continuation in England and Wales of some forty-three separate police forces and, in 2012, the creation of the elected office of Police and Crime Commissioner as well as the ending of the direct link between the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police through the introduction of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime in London. In England and Wales, therefore, the trend has been against further centralisation. 7 The article will seek to comment on points of commonality and divergence between Scotland and other parts of Britain across the twentieth century, reflecting in particular on the dynamics of the relationship between the Home Office and Scottish Office. Whilst addressing these questions, the structure of this article is a chronological one as that which best enables the charting of continuity and change. It is not our intention to revisit the emergence and development of police forces in Scotland in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which has been comparatively well-charted in a range of doctoral studies and other works. 8 Rather, we seek to fill a significant gap in terms of the dearth of research on the twentieth century. The evidence-base is largely archival, drawing substantively on officially generated files in the National Records of Scotland, as well as local and national newspaper coverage; nevertheless, reference is also made to 4 interviews with former police officers that touch on their experiences of regionalisation (the creation of the eight 'legacy' forces in 1975). 
Nineteenth-century contexts: Alfred List and David Monro
The idea of a single policing body for Scotland has its origins in the nineteenth century, was largely grounded in fears of civil unrest and disorder in the Borders and Highlands (rather than rapidly urbanising areas), and was promoted by a new but small elite of highly influential professional policemen (including inspectors of constabulary). It failed to gain wider currency because of the liberal consensus amongst the political classes that associated such a centralising agenda with autocratic foreign regimes and because of the dissipation of any real threat of civil disobedience.
In June 1853 the head of Midlothian Police, Alfred J. List, put forward a plan for 'a uniform system of county police' in evidence that he gave to the Select Committee of Police.
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Having joined the Metropolitan Police as an original 'Peeler' in 1829, List had been appointed as the commanding officer of the first Scottish county police force of East Lothian in 1832, where he received praise for his success in introducing a 'very efficient system of police'. 10 In 1840 he had published A Practical Treatise on Rural Police and moved to lead Midlothian constabulary. 11 This publication and his work in advising counties in the south of Scotland on the formation of their 'new' police forces ensured that he became the most influential writer and thinker on policing in nineteenth-century Scotland. 12 List's ideas for the consolidation of police forces were drawn from his experience of the difficulties of policing large populations of navvies working on the building of the railways and of ensuring public order with relatively few men. 13 He looked back fondly upon his service in London where a large number of police officers could be assembled to deal with an emergency. 14 A further factor, however, that shaped his plan for consolidation was the ability of people and communications systems to traverse administrative boundaries, an argument that came to be emphasised in the twentieth century as the development of motor traffic increased the pace of 6 transport further. When List gave evidence to the 1853 select committee he advised that the four counties who had not yet formed police forces should be compelled to do so under a rural police act, because 'there is no uniformity of action, in the case of escapees, or information being sent from one part of the county to the other'. 15 List went on to outline the structure of a uniform policing system: Its governance should be under an officer attached to the Crown Agent's office, with a sub for the north, and another for the south of the Tay; and as many counties are small, and others entirely rural, two or three should be united together for police purposes, under the charge of a superintendent or inspector; all orders or instructions to emanate from the chief constable, and periodic reports to be made by him to the Lord Advocate.
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For List the system had three main advantages: economy of scale; consistency in approach;
and a significant reduction in local interference. The last point was the most controversial in effectively proposing an elevation of a technocratic head of police and a diminution in the power of local elites:
… I would not set aside the Commissioners of Supply, but I would not allow them to interfere with the men; they should have only certain duties to perform, and should not interfere with orders emanating from the head of the police. 17 List might have hoped that his reputation would ensure that he would be the obvious candidate for the role of chief constable of all the counties of Scotland. In making his case, however, he had over-stepped the mark in criticising those with whom his own position, 7 status and authority was bound up. At a meeting of the (elected) Police Commissioners of the City of Edinburgh, List was described as 'one of the leading witnesses in support of centralising opinions' and likened to 'some petty German prince … laying down the law to the Emperor of Austria or King of Prussia'. 18 As Graeme Morton has carefully shown, municipal government in early nineteenthcentury Scottish burghs was seen as the protector of civic virtue, associational culture, and civil society in opposition to the model of a centralised authoritarian nation state. Yet centre and locale were bound together in a symbiotic relationship since statute law enabled local self-determination: 'the centre gave powers to local government to do its bidding, but this approach was balanced and thereby sanctioned for the reason that local government in turn demanded its own powers from the state'. 19 Police constables gained any legitimacy they had from their association with local civil administration and thence from the idea that municipal authorities were locally elected and thus directly answerable to local opinion. Central government, in turn, was dependant on locales for the regulation of public order. For Morton, municipal government 'was suitably empowered by the central state to govern on its behalf and this maintained the legitimacy of each'. 20 This equilibrium was reconfigured but maintained as a result of the 1857 Police (Scotland) Act which, whilst not introducing the single police force that List had hoped for, compelled towns, burghs and counties to form their own police forces, introduced a state grant amounting to 'One Fourth of the Charge for the Pay and Clothing', and created the post of Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (HMICS). 21 The inspector was 'to visit and inquire into the State and Efficiency of the Police appointed for every County and Burgh', and he was empowered to advise that the state grant be refused if a force was deemed inefficient. 22 The Act referred to amalgamation by stating in section 61 that 'Burghs may agree to consolidate their Police with County Force'; although it was expressed in terms of permission rather than compulsion, the potential 8 to withhold the grant on the grounds of 'inefficiency' could be used as leverage. 23 In this way, then, centre and locale held a set of checks and sanctions against each other, including the sharing of the allocation of resources.
From their appointment in 1859, HMICSs pressed for the amalgamation of small burgh forces with their surrounding counties or adjacent burghs. There was some early success in that five burghs (Dysart, Kirkcaldy, Musselburgh, St. Andrews and Wishaw)
agreed to consolidate with their counties under the enabling clause of the new police act. 24 For first HMICS John Kinloch, operational efficiency meant having a 'well-disciplined police' that was effectively drilled, trained and properly paid. He was highly critical of small burghs of fewer than 5,000 population and who 'in some cases had their town officers, lamplighters, scavengers (and in more than one instance, the sexton), sworn in as constables, dressed in a blue uniform, and exhibited to me as their "police force"'. 25 As David Barrie has shown, two-thirds of burgh forces were deemed 'inefficient' upon their first inspection in 1859 compared to only two of the thirty-two rural constabularies. 26 However, the sanction of the grant was rejected by some burghs who attempted to remain relatively autonomous. 32 To deal with the disturbances Inverness-shire Constabulary had more than doubled in size between 1880 and 1883, from forty to ninety-four officers. 33 However, in January 1884 a detachment of police officers had been driven away in a humiliating manner by crofters in Glendale, in the north of Skye. The involvement of the county police had simply reinforced already entrenched assumptions that they were simply the 'agents of the proprietorial class'. 34 The police failure also acted as a further impetus for Despite the increasingly regulatory role of the centre, services continued to be organised and delivered at the local level and the power relationship between them is best characterised as one of 'interdependence' in the running of a 'national local government system'. 38 Networks that were personal, associational and professional ran across as well as along the local/central axes, binding as well as sometimes fracturing policy communities. In Scotland a further layer of complexity was clearly added by the creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 which, it has been argued, exercised a largely mediatory role in its early years, advising councils on their statutory duties. 39 With the upgrading of the role of the secretary of state for Scotland in 1926, relocation to Edinburgh, and the expansion of the civil service associated with it, a more interventionist role developed. 40 If the Scottish Office was unlikely to act as a point of resistance to Westminster, it sought nonetheless to negotiate compromises that took Scottish particularity into account. had proposed the gradual reduction of Scottish forces on the grounds of efficiency and economy to a total of fourteen. The areas covered were to be sufficiently small to allow senior officers 'to visit all police stations at regular intervals, and so acquire and maintain an intimate knowledge of local affairs throughout the whole of the district'; they were also shaped by existing sheriffdoms. 42 It was suggested that Glasgow City, for example, should be amalgamated with Lanarkshire and the burgh forces within this area; Edinburgh would be amalgamated with the Lothians and Peebles. The Ormidale report drew attention to the current anomaly in which two police forces (the county and the burgh) sustained separate headquarters in the same town (this was the case in Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Inverness, Ayr, Hamilton, Dumbarton, Stirling, Perth, Paisley and Inverness). Significantly, the Ormidale committee rejected the idea that Scotland should simply be divided into two or three districts along the lines of a 'national' force because 'the present close association of the police with local affairs and local administration … no doubt helps to create a good and friendly atmosphere between the police and the public'. 43 The recommendations were supported by the cities of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen, whilst county councils were split and policing groups remained neutral. However, fifteen of the nineteen Scottish cities or burghs had vociferously objected to the proposals and, through a deputation to the Scottish Office, had 'made it clear that the Committee's recommendations were quite unacceptable'. 44 This uncompromising position meant that the report was 'pigeon-holed' (as senior civil servant Charles Craik Cunningham put it), 45 and only one attempt to bring about voluntary amalgamation was successful throughout the 1930s (the case of Dumfries). 46 This pattern of recommendations from the centre, resistance from municipalities, and reluctance to force the matter was broadly similar to the situation in England and Wales in the first part of the twentieth century. Emsley has commented that in terms of official rhetoric 'governments and civil servants continued to support the idea of local control of the police except in London' (where the Metropolitan Police had always been subject to direct Home
Office control) whilst attempting to develop tactics to undermine this. 47 Attempts to encourage amalgamation in the 1930s were opposed by the Association of Municipal 48 Municipal authorities were temporarily appeased by the promise that this was for the duration of the war only. Nevertheless, many police officers themselves advocated 'nationalisation' of the police, showing a clear mismatch between those involved in operation duties and their employers. 49 In Scotland civil servants were extremely concerned about problems of communication between small forces, which had been exposed as a result of two incidents in East Lothian. A training exercise in August 1941-involving two men posing as 'Fifth Columnists'-had gone badly wrong when the men were allowed entry to East Lothian police headquarters, Haddington, with obviously forged identity cards although clear descriptions had been circulated beforehand. In early 1942 East Lothian police had failed to pass on information about a parachutist sighted in the area to neighbouring forces. 50 HMICS Brigadier-General H. M. Dudgeon, who had looked into the matter, was of the view that problems were exacerbated by the difficulty of attracting high quality recruits to small burgh and county forces; and the creation of larger forces would create more opportunities for promotion and career development. 51 In February   14 1942, therefore, the Scottish Office was carefully considering a proposal to reduce the number of Scottish police forces to eighteen, but there were concerns this would be 'highly contentious' given that 'public opinion is [not] yet prepared to support the government in legislation to force consolidation on unwilling Police Authorities' and thus 'politically impossible'. 52 Senior Scottish Office civil servants (including Cunningham) were convinced in theory that complete 'nationalisation', ideally on a UK basis, was needed (along the lines of the reorganisation already carried through for the fire service). 53 Discussions had taken place with the secretary of state for Scotland, Tom Johnston, as to whether a case should be made for Scotland to be omitted altogether from the Defence (Amalgamation) Regulations on the grounds that it would neither be popular nor resolve broader problems. Whilst, therefore, the regulations were applicable across the UK, Johnston made it clear that they were likely to 'be a dead letter in Scotland' and, indeed, no amalgamations resulted north of the border. Advertiser argued that 'The Highland blood is up … There's need for increasing vigilance by local authorities over their rights and powers. They should not be overawed by the dictates of Edinburgh and Whitehall'. 56 The Scottish Office proposal was for the appointment of the existing Inverness-shire chief to head up both police forces. HMICS Dudgeon complained that the press had been rabble-rousing, that he had been welcomed by 'a very cordial 15 reception and a perfect hearing' upon a visit a few weeks previously, and that the Scottish Office's preferred candidate was 'every inch a Highlander -born in Ross-shire, a Seaforth
Highlander; his mother tongue -Gaelic'. 57 The issue, however was not Highland credentials.
It was the matter of rivalry between county and burgh (that had manifested itself in disagreement over education matters), and the principle of central interference. The elected representatives of the royal burghs continued to defend their 'right to local government' that had been forged in the nineteenth century, rather than expressing any desire for Scottish national government. 58 It was significant that Inverness Burgh went ahead with the appointment of its own candidate as chief constable in January 1943 in what had come to be seen across Scotland as something of a test case. Rather than force the issue, Johnston simply approved the appointment. 59 The legitimacy of central government (including the Scottish Office), particularly given concerns about morale in wartime, was still bound up with and maintained by its ability to empower municipal autonomy in Scotland. amalgamations 'may be in the interests of efficiency' he was 'most anxious' that this should be done through 'voluntary agreement' and that 'compulsion should be used as a last resort. 61 In February 1945 a confidential note was sent out by the Scottish Home department to all 16 police authorities and associations asking for discussion of the procedures to be used to enable and ultimately, force, amalgamations:
There is no intention of suggesting that power should be taken to create Regional Police Forces, still less that police functions should be taken over as a national service. His Majesty's government are satisfied that it would be wrong to make any fundamental alteration at present in the traditional framework of the Police Service … It is also recognised that the maintenance of a separate police force in a particular county or burgh may well be a legitimate cause of local pride.
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Police opinion was in favour of larger forces, and clearly accepted the argument that it would improve the status of police officers within a more professionalised service and thus the quality of recruits. With the exception of Charles Roy of Kilmarnock who sided with the oppositional stance taken in the burgh, the Chief Constables (Scotland) Association approved of the proposals. Similarly, lower ranks did not object to the possibility of amalgamation, although they asked that officers should have rights to remain within specific geographical locations rather than be transferred long distances against their wishes. Amongst local authorities, the Association of County Councils was similarly in accord, as were the cities. As in the 1930s, however, the Convention of Royal Burghs voiced concerns about the threat of compulsion; the Lord Provost of Perth argued that 'they were proud of the ancient burghal powers and privileges' although they would be 'glad to take over the policing of the counties'. 63 Clearly, if any form of amalgamation was to go ahead, the suggestion that one local authority was 'taking over' another would need to be avoided and, indeed, the notion of compulsion had to be handled with sensitivity. 64 Rather than proceeding with a UK-wide bill, a separate Scottish Bill was prepared and successfully enacted by a new secretary of state for Scotland in the Atlee administration, Joseph Westwood. Packaging the reform as part of the modern plan for post-war social reconstruction, he argued that:
the mobility of criminals, to whom the existence of numerous police boundaries was a godsend, the increase of road traffic and of road accidents, which created problems requiring unified police control over relatively large areas, the increasing need for expensive technical apparatus and for creating specialised police departments, all made it essential to have reasonably large units of administration. Fraser, offered 'an assurance that he did not intend to embark on any wholesale amalgamations'. 66 Crucially, compared to the act for England and Wales, the Scottish legislation did not automatically abolish forces. The 1946 Police (Scotland) Act enabled two or more local police authorities working together to submit a voluntary scheme for amalgamation to the secretary of state for approval. If satisfactory voluntary schemes were not forthcoming, then a proposal could be put forward by the secretary of state for amalgamation on the grounds of 'efficiency'. This would then be the subject of a full public enquiry, and would require the approval of Parliament.
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There were also differences between the Police (Scotland) Act 1946 and the legislation for England and Wales in relation to the organisation of local governance. In
England and Wales an entirely new police authority-that was effectively autonomous of local councils-was to be created when forces were combined. In Scotland, however, a slightly different model was adopted, that of 'the joint committee consisting of representatives of the constituent authorities, who remained the police authorities for their respective areas but whose function relating to police … were delegated to the joint committee'. 68 Local authorities were to work together and in partnership (albeit one that had been reconfigured and hence enabled by the centre) rather than feel that policing had been taken out of their hands. Acceptance of merger tended to come from counties, who were persuaded that there were significant advantages in terms of recruitment, the sharing of technologies, and improved systems of communication across large geographical areas and given the relative dispersal of population. In 1949, for example, when the new North-Eastern Counties Constabulary was created, local constituencies were reasonably satisfied that the relationship between police and community would not be undermined since 'the village bobby will remain the backbone of the service' and that there would be material benefits in terms of 'greater resources, more mobility and no boundaries'. 70 Arguably, in county areas, where individual constables were often isolated from each other but embedded within village life, it was the relationship that was forged though everyday encounters that was more important than formal structures of governance. Moreover, the role of the village constable had, since the late nineteenth century been concerned with largely administrative tasks that were peripatetic: attending sheepdippings, checking fire-arms licences, undertaking the twice-yearly census of vagrants.
Furthermore, the increase in road traffic as a policing activity had increased awareness of the connectednessof rural areas. This contrasted with the model of burgh policing at mid-century, in which beat patrol still centred on the fabric and furniture of the street (owned by the burgh) and on the protection of the private property of local businesses, tradespeople and property owners (from which the burgh council was drawn). 71 The case of Ayr Burgh 73 James Lowdon, who was seventy-three years of age and had acted as chief constable for the previous forty-six years, defended his track record as a pioneer in introducing new technologies such as finger-printing and photography early on, and in being one of the first to employ policewomen (in 1918); detection rates were 'very good'. 74 The case was also made that policing in the burgh was highly specialised or particular because of the unique demography generated by the tourism associated with
Burns's cottage, the herring fleet, and the 'racehorse crowd' (which had necessitated the introduction of a local system of regulation for bookmakers). 75 Finally, the case hinged on an argument about the significance of local autonomy in achieving police successes. The chair 20 of the local chamber of commerce told the enquiry: 'I think they have attained their efficiency through being friendly with the local population'. He agreed that 'confidence springs from the identification of the police with the burgh' and 'the fact that the townspeople know the man on the beat'. 76 The issue of identity was picked up by the town clerk, who commented on the effectiveness of special constables during the recent war because there was a very strong 'esprit de corps' that was 'associated with the Burgh community' and 'with the local character of the force'. were determined to defend 'to the death'. 81 Whilst it was suggested that in Edinburgh a shift towards rejection of amalgamation (with Lothians and Peebles) had been orchestrated by the Progressives (in response to a central Labour administration), in Motherwell and Wishaw amalgamation was 'unanimously opposed by progressive, Labour and Scottish National Party (SNP) candidates at ward meetings in the build-up to local elections'. 82 The Ayr Burgh victory undoubtedly had a galvanising effect on other burghs. In April 1958 Hamilton town council decided to appoint its own chief constable despite sharing one with Lanarkshire for the past ten years and continued as a separate force until 1967. 83 In Scotland no compulsory amalgamations took place in the 1940s or 1950s and, indeed, there was little impetus or appetite at the Scottish Office to press the matter in the wake of the Ayr Burgh case.
However police reform continued as a matter of intense debate and discussion across the UK, culminating in the report of the 1962 Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, which, amongst other recommendations, stated that something should be done about the 'extreme case of the multiplicity of small forces' in Scotland. 'Very considerable further reduction' was 'urgently' needed and only the four cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen) should remain as independent urban forces. 84 In its evidence to the Royal Commission the Scottish Home Department had acknowledged that a reduction to nineteen forces was desirable but that this 'would be bitterly opposed by the burghs'. 85 Moreover, the Royal Commission also carefully considered evidence for and against the idea of a 'unified national police service'. Indeed, the police federations of Scotland, England and
Wales were all in support of a regional or national service. Chief constables, however, were reluctant to endorse it (with the exception of Lancashire's Colonel Eric St Johnston). 86 Ultimately the commission endorsed the idea of local control of local forces, stating that it was persuaded by 'the wide concurrence of view among witnesses representing the central Government, the local authority associations and the police [ie.
Chief Constables]' that 22 'police organisation based on local forces and administered by partnership between local and central government' would 'meet the needs of the time'. 87 In England and Wales the 1964 Police Act removed the powers to appoint, dismiss and discipline officers from watch committees (urban areas) and handed them over to chief constables (in Scotland this role was already undertaken by police chiefs). It also gave the home secretary further powers to force amalgamation, which were used by Roy Jenkins to cut provincial forces further from 117 to forty-nine in 1966. 88 In Scotland civil servants were beginning to feel they looked 'laggard' in comparison and were instructed to re-open the files: 'the chosen victim is Inverness -county and burgh'. 89 Rather than attempt to introduce a new police bill for Scotland, the decision was made to use the arts of diplomacy on a case by case basis, with HMICS Andrew Meldrum, himself a former chief constable of Inverness Burgh, to play a key role in steering the process. In July 1966 secretary of state William Ross read out a statement announcing his desire for 'a limited programme of amalgamation' to reduce the total number of Scottish forces to twenty, which he hoped would be 'brought about by negotiation and agreement'. Police authorities were to be encouraged once again to develop 'voluntary' schemes but public inquiry would be used if agreement was not reached. 90 The feelings in Inverness Burgh had long been against a simple amalgamation with the county with whom it was described as 'daggers drawn' as a result of continued financial disagreements over education matters. By 1966, indeed, the town clerk 'favoured nationalisation or regionalisation' through amalgamation with the whole of the north of Scotland, given that similar structures were deemed to have worked well in the case of the fire service. 91 Yet the secretary of state for Scotland refused to countenance this as 'not in the public interest' because he thought a police district covering the whole of the north would be 'too large', suggesting that even in the late 1960s the Scottish Office was reluctant to move to more regionalised structures. 92 At this point Shetland (Zetland Constabulary) and Orkney
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were required to consolidate with Caithness (although Shetlanders argued that their transport links were more obviously with Aberdeen). 93 Ultimately, in the case of both Ayr and Inverness, the Scottish Office bounced the burghs into amalgamation with their respective counties by taking the matter to inquiry, which it ensured was conducted judiciously this time. By 1968, the Scottish Office had finally achieved its objectives in reducing the number of police forces to what was deemed an appropriate level but the system of direct local control by police committees, albeit 'joint' ones uniting burgh with county, continued.
Across the twentieth century, therefore, resistance overwhelming came from the royal burghs (although county constabularies also voiced objections). A strong sense of civic pride and identity was expressed through the rhetoric of democracy, in which it was argued that local police forces should be accountable to local people. Sense of 'community' was associated with local autonomy in opposition to the centralising state, and was articulated through sense of place. Moreover, local, meant 'civic'. These beliefs-which were cultural and political-remained pretty much intact until the early 1960s. Supporters of amalgamation tended to make arguments that, in contrast, were financial and logistical. Arguably, the inability of the Scottish Office to resolve the debate resulted from the lack of agreement about its terms of reference.
Regionalisation and beyond
The final move towards regionalisation of the police service-and the creation of the eight forces that were to serve Scotland for the next forty years-was the not the result of discussions about the optimum geographical entities to deliver effective operational policing.
Rather it was an effect of the broader strategy of local government reform which saw the abolition of separate local government status for burghs, counties, cities and districts in 1975
with the creation of the new two-tier regional structure (of regional councils delivering major services, underpinned by multiple district councils delivering local planning and improvements). 94 Interviews with former officers who were serving at the time indicate that in the new Northern Constabulary, criticism of the regional structure was much less marked than in the central west of Scotland. 104 In rural areas officers retained significant amounts of autonomy and discretion and their role continued to be that of a generalist; for them regionalisation brought greater access to resources and enabled them to call on those who were specialists when this was needed. While officers did find themselves having to move greater distances for new posts this was offset for many by the increased opportunity for promotion. In contrast, in urban areas of the central west of Scotland where policing was largely streetbased, officers had less autonomy, a more specific set of tasks and duties, and a more geographically defined area of responsibility. While they still enjoyed a high level of day-today discretion, they were more constrained by their role, meaning front-line working practices were more susceptible to alteration if and when bureaucratic structures and procedures changed. Therefore, when Glasgow's working practices were rolled out to the outlying areas of Strathclyde after regionalisation, the changes were always likely to be more substantial and more keenly felt than amongst their 'Northern' counterparts. With the perception among many officers that a model of policing based on Glasgow City was unsuitable for other locales, the attempts to unify working practices were often met with grudging acceptance, and occasionally even outright resistance. To those less enthusiastic about these imposed changes, the newly formed force was disparagingly referred to as 'Strath-Glasgow'. 105 However, as was the case in Northern, many officers appreciated the career benefits brought about by being in a larger force. The experience of regionalisation varied depending on the career trajectories of individual officers and the forces that they served in. The interviews do suggest, however, that the introduction of any new policing 27 model needs to be sufficiently flexible to recognise differences in local cultures and local needs whatever the larger structures, labels or identities that are formally set in place.
Conclusions
From the setting up of a Scotland-wide system of 'local' policing in the mid-nineteenth century, the desirability of a move towards a regional or national model was discussed and debated. The Victorian assumption that 'local' policing meant 'local' control through municipal and county councils as that which best enabled accountability and hence legitimacy was challenged but remained intact until around 1960. Whilst the control of local elites may have persisted in the dominance of particular classes as elected members of police authorities, the rhetoric of 'the public' was increasingly used to refer to wider democratic principles and to defend the status quo. For the Scottish Office (and Home Office) as well as for many police officers themselves, however, the move to much larger policing units was desirable on the grounds of economy, efficiency, and professionalisation, including the ability to pool resources, invest in shared specialised units, and offer greater prospects of promotion and career progression. The development of transport systems that made populations (including criminal ones) increasingly mobile was a further incentive. For most of the period, however, the idea of a 'national' force remained anathema, its proponents making the case most emphatically in relation to periods of unrest, disorder and emergency, a strikingly different context from the creation of Police Scotland in 2013.
Whilst its trajectory was broadly similar, the pace of amalgamation was different in Scotland compared to England as a result of the pressure exerted by the royal burghs (as well as some counties and cities). In the nineteenth century the leverage that central government had been able to exercise was also different given the lower central grant: initially a quarter of expenditure compared to the Treasury contribution of a half that was enacted in England 28 and Wales in 1876. Whilst this had been equalised in Scotland after the First World War, the Scottish Office was acutely aware of its dependency on local government for the effective delivery of law and order. From the mid-1930s until the 1960s a series of secretaries of state for Scotland (and civil servants) used the tactics of suggestion and persuasion to try to shift the climate of opinion. Whilst party political rivalries reared their head at various points, this was more to do with factionalism and the flexing of tensions within the relationship between local and central government. Compulsion was to be used as a last resort, but there was considerable nervousness around doing so. The approach was often piecemeal and opportunistic rather than strategic, with the retirement (or occasional disgrace) of chief constables being seized upon to press for amalgamation with a neighbouring force.
The final reduction to twenty and then eight forces was a result of the reconfiguration of local government, and is illustrative of the fact that the organisation of policing has tended to follow the organisation of local administration rather than any logic regarding the geographical needs or characteristics of operational policing. However, it can also been seen as a result of the intensification of technological change and the beginnings of a communications revolution that transformed operational policing itself. From the early nineteenth century to around 1960 urban policing had been delivered through the model of the beat constable who used foot patrol to make his presence felt on the streets, who was largely engaged in the protection of property and whose knowledge was personal, local and experiential. In contrast, the last thirty years of the twentieth century saw the shift to mobile policing units, the sharing of information through telecommunications and digital technologies, and the growth in concern about international and cyber-crimes.
Whilst the 'local' continues to be a central focal point and priority, the emphasis from the 1970s onwards has been towards the idea of local community (and, indeed, pluralised communities that are both geographical and diasporic) rather than the formality of local 29 government, municipal boundaries and officialdom. Further local government reform in 1996, which replaced the model of regional two-tier government with thirty-two unitary authorities meant that even the administrative logic behind the creation of the eight regional police forces was effectively lost, although they retained their cultural identities for a further twenty years. The political context that led to the creation of Police Scotland was certainly historically unique-as a policy opportunity that resulted from increased devolution and the election of an SNP government-although, like earlier proposals for reform, it was grounded in arguments about the need for economy and ever-greater efficiency. 106 As this article has shown, the rapidity with which the single service was created was also completely unprecedented, given the procrastination and slow burn that characterised the move towards amalgamation across the previous 150 years.
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